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Abstract Equity financing modes currently adopted by Islamic 
banks are seen to be based on debt-based formats, originally 
developed for implementation in in interest-based financing 
system.  With the experience gained over a period, a careful 
scrutiny of prevalent equity financing techniques could be 
appropriate in order to assess the level of their success in 
achieving Islamic economic objectives.  With Islamic banking 
gaining a firm foothold in the banking and commercial 
sectors, a more dynamic approach to promulgating the ideals 
of equity participation appears timely.  
I.    INTRODUCTION 
roviding finance could materialise either in a manner 
where the seeker of funds becomes indebted to the 
provider, or through extending funds by way of capital 
participation in a joint venture, where practicable.  The 
former, commonly referred to as debt-financing, includes 
means of financing such as extension of loans against 
interest or otherwise, sale on deferred  
payment, lease etc, where the process leads to the creation 
of a debt.  In the latter mode where funds are provided as 
capital exposed to profit or loss, the liability remains with 
the provider to the extent of his capital, and no debt is 
created.  This latter method, which could be called equity 
financing as it is based on contributing equity, is the 
recommended avenue for all venture-financing done by 
Islamic banks, from a theoretical perspective.  In addition 
to equity financing, Islamic economic ideals proposed as 
alternatives to debt financing also include qard hasan or 
gain-free (i.e. interest-free) loan.   However, under the 
prevalent commercial paradigm and its approach to money, 
this alternative could not be expected to play a significant 
role in business finance today,  as such loans are not 
purported to give rise to any material increase directly or 
indirectly.   
Thus, a large proportion of all business financing in an 
Islamic economy would be based on equity financing, 
where the financier shares in the profit and loss of the 
business financed.  This article attempts to study the 
possible outcomes of financing based on debt vis-a-vis 
equity-based financing in the context of Islamic economic 
ideals, and to analyse problems faced by Islamic banks in 
adopting an equity-based approach to financing in an 
earnest manner 
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II. EQUITY FINANCING AND DEBT FINANCING: A 
COMPARISON    
It would be worthwhile to undertake a review of the 
possible practical reasons why the Islamic economic system 
gives preference to an equity-based approach to financing 
ventures.  It is argued that in financing on the basis of 
equity participation, the funds required by the venture are 
injected as equity or capital that is entitled to a share of any 
profits realised through the venture, while being exposed to 
erosion or total eradication in the event of loss.  The funds 
increase the equity base of the venture, thus providing 
stability.  The profit and loss both are distributed among all 
participants who contribute towards the equity, which is 
differentiates this mode of financing from debt financing.  
Thus, equity financing entails mutual sharing of risks 
pertaining to the enterprise and an equitable distribution of 
the return.  The actual rate of return of all sharing parties 
will be determined ex post in accordance with the actual 
performance of the venture.   
In conventional debt financing, additional finance sought is 
injected in the form of a loan at a predetermined rate of 
interest.  The funds injected come as a liability on the 
venture, which is to be repaid with the interest, according to 
the terms agreed.  The funds do not play any role in 
increasing the equity base.  They remain a foreign element 
as far as the assets of the venture are concerned, and do not 
take a constructive share in enhancing the networth.  
Therefore, even a large amount of funds injected as a debt 
serves only the purpose of inflating the cash position 
temporarily.  Profit / loss of the venture is borne solely by 
the entrepreneur, the lender not being immediately 
concerned with this aspect.  Irrespective of the ultimate 
profitability of the venture, the lender is entitled to receive 
the agreed amount of interest.  Thus, risks are associated 
with the entrepreneur solely.       
In profit sharing arrangements, only shares of expected 
profit are determined at the outset, while the actual rate of 
return on investments is to be determined in the end, on the 
basis of realised profits.  However, debt, on the other hand, 
requires predetermined interest payments, and business 
difficulties may create pressures on the firm‘s cash flow, 
forcing it to forgo lucrative business ventures, borrow 
further, or sell its existing assets.  As equity finance does 
not create such mandatory payment, the cost of adjustment 
to any contingency is lower.   Therefore, proponents argue 
that in an advanced economy, equity financing should be 
the rule and not the last resort.  Profit sharing provides 
more flexibility in meeting contingencies.  This is because 
of the balanced distribution of gains as well as the risks 
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among the participants in equity financing, while debt is 
restrictive and unforgiving, hence less stable 
 
2Usamah A Othman, ―Debt and equity contracts in the 
theory of social economy‖ (1994) vol. 3, No. 1 Review of 
Islamic Economics 5.   
3Ibid.   
Researchers have highlighted the property right imbalance 
in debt finance arising through the fixed nature of the 
interest element.  One party, i.e. the lender, has some 
permanent and contractually guaranteed rights, while the 
other, the borrower, only has some temporary and residual 
rights.  Such imbalance and asymmetry of property rights 
may entice opportunistic behaviour on the part of the 
borrower in several forms such as misappropriation of 
funds or forgoing altogether of what could otherwise be a 
profitable venture.  On the part of the lender, should 
difficulties develop, he could resort to foreclosure and 
liquidate what could be a better business in the long run.  
In depositing funds with a bank under an equity 
arrangement, instead of being guaranteed for the face value 
of deposits, the depositors here are essentially shareholders 
whose returns vary with the profits and losses of the bank.  
The situation could be even compared to accounts in 
mutual funds.  This would render deposit insurance 
unnecessary, and there would be less likelihood of financial 
panics or runs.  Research in the area of mutual-fund 
banking comes to the same conclusion.   Researchers also 
observe that under equity financing, assets and liabilities of 
the bank would move together due to the above reason.  
This, while relieving banking authorities from excessive 
regulatory oversight, would result in the net-worth values 
constantly giving an adequate read on the health of the 
financial institution.        
In debt financing, the possibility of refinancing brings 
about an uncertainty for both parties as to the nature of the 
future terms of the contract.  It may even induce the debtor 
to liquidate to save as much as he can of the present value 
before foreclosure prevents him from saving his own 
equity.  In a profit sharing arrangement, there is less 
incentive for this even if the expected average gross rate of 
return changes, due to the absence of a strict obligation of 
principal repayment on the entrepreneur.  The return to the 
capital investor will be in accordance with the actual 
market conditions.  
In the equity based risk / reward sharing system, value 
judgements as well as strength of the proposal would both 
play an important role in the allocation of resources.   
Financing of any economic or business activity turns into 
an ownership stake, and banks have an incentive to make 
the joint venture work.  They become fully involved in 
overseeing the project and make sure that the money is 
spent wisely.   Similarly, the equity arrangement should 
encourage the borrower to exert more effort in his 
endeavour and should lessen the moral hazard problem of 
underreporting profits.   The fusion between investment 
experience and financial experience found in the Islamic 
banking system could provide 
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the maximum guarantee for sounder investment through the 
best possible utilisation of limited resources.    
III. EQUITY FINANCING IN THE PRACTICE OF ISLAMIC BANKS 
The above was a brief exposition of some basic aspects 
pertaining to debt and equity modes of financing in the 
context of banking, from an Islamic economic perspective.  
Despite of certain advantages as could be perceived in the 
equity mode, the conventional system of banking and 
finance is seen to be founded on debt financing with the 
interest-based loan as its primary building block, equity 
financing usually being the last resort.  The conventional 
system has refused to share in the risk of the ventures 
financed in any manner, sufficing with the risk-free gain 
through interest income.  More surprisingly, adoption of 
equity financing modes by Islamic banks themselves is 
noted to be less common than the use of debt-financing 
modes.  The latter usually involve various adaptations of 
mark-up schemes, and are employed for the most part in 
short-term financing.  Although Islamic banks are allowed 
to invest in businesses directly in addition to financing third 
party enterprises, in actual fact, direct investment by 
Islamic banks is not seen to have flourished due to a variety 
of factors, not the least among them being the identity 
inherited from the conventional industry as mere financial 
intermediaries, and legal impediments resultant of this 
identity.  Debt-based structures frequently adopted by 
Islamic banks are murābahah, ijārah, istisnā‛, and numerous 
variations based on these.  Application of equity financing 
modes is seen to be less developed and adopted sometimes 
in unfavourable conditions where they may not function in 
a manner that could reveal their full potential.   
The tendency among Islamic banks has been to invest in 
short-term deals, due to the apprehension that involvement 
in long-term equity projects could affect regular payments 
of profit to depositors, a necessary aspect in competing 
with conventional banks.  Such aversion to long-term 
investment reduces the efficiency of Islamic banks in the 
long run.   In the Malaysian context, Islamic banking is 
concentrated in the individual customer sector and not in 
commerce and industry.   Despite of the fact that short-term 
financing, involving trade financing and other types, 
performs an important economic function, such financing 
does not cause the creation or increase of additional 
production capital, on which real economic growth rests.  
Thus, emphasis on short-term financing would not be 
congruent with social needs  
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The Japanese experience could provide a real-time 
example.  By engaging in joint debt-equity finance, the 
Japanese bank is able to address the agency problem of 
information asymmetry (Amir Barnea, Robert A Haugen, 
Lemma W Senbet, Agency problems and financial 
contracting, Prentice Hall, 1985, p. 38, in Akacem, Gilliam 
above.)  Since the bank is now part owner, it has access to 
more information on the firm and in turn achieves 
efficiency gains in monitoring (Sun Bae Kim, ―The use of 
equity positions by banks: the Japanese evidence‖ (Fall 
1991) The Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco 41, 43, in Akacem, Gilliam above.)        
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Problems in implementing equity structures 
While some have gone so far as to question the sincerity of 
Islamic banks in devising workable interest-free 
alternatives,  i.e. based on equity participation, reasons 
cited by others for the lukewarm interest shown by current-
day Islamic financial institutions in implementing equity 
structures carry some similar themes.  A major factor could 
be that equity financing is commonly perceived as difficult 
in operation.  This perception appears to arise from the 
conventional banking standpoint, where equity financing is 
considered specialized business carrying drawbacks such as 
risk, difficult nature, long gestation period and potential 
involvement in management.   Mudārabah financing is 
assessed to have more agency problems compared to 
conventional debt or equity financing.   Obligation to 
oversee projects in which they are partners is another 
potential deterrent.  This requires managerial skills and 
expertise in overseeing different investment projects.   
Clients and projects to be financed require more careful 
evaluation.  
While some of the above factors had been partially 
addressed in the foregoing appraisal of equity financing and 
debt financing, some additional responses could be 
reviewed here.  It has been pointed out that costs and other 
requirements pertaining to auditing and monitoring internal 
performance and related issues are part of set-up costs, 
which are needed irrespective of the form of finance.   
Others argue that debt financing only bypasses the need for 
information by requiring collateral and creditworthiness to 
ensure repayment of principal plus fixed, predetermined 
interest.  The issue of information cost in the profit loss 
sharing system, i.e. equity financing, has to be judged by 
comparing the benefits of collecting information with the 
costs associated with it.  Moreover, in a bank-client 
relationship, it is hardly likely that the client would 
contemplate of only a single transaction with the bank and 
be tempted to withhold information.  In the context of the 
need for a continued bank-client relationship and 
competitive demand for bank finances, the problem of 
information asymmetry poses less of a problem.  In fact, 
the issue exists in all market transactions, which is taken 
care of through credit rating and other measures.  
Institutions and conventions could be developed, when 
those in existence are considered inadequate, to restrict 
gains from fraud.   It should be conceded in this regard that 
within profit loss sharing techniques, mushārakah might 
have an edge over mudārabah in the sense that in 
mushārakah, the capital owner has a right to enter into the 
management and hence have some control over the 
problems created by information asymmetry and moral 
hazards. 
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Therefore, although some have suggested asymmetry of 
information as an explanation of why profit loss sharing has 
failed to prevail in a competitive market despite of being 
superior to the interest-based system or mark-up based 
techniques, others have highlighted the fallacy of this 
supposition as outlined above.  Thus, it is necessary to 
investigate other causes for this phenomenon.  A major 
hurdle could be the economic structure, which may have a 
bias in favour of the interest-based system rather than a 
profit and loss sharing arrangement.  Tax structures are 
regarded unfavourable to equity formats.  While interest 
payments are deductible expenses and result in reducing the 
tax burden, adopting equity financing thus claiming a share 
in profits could increase tax liabilities for the entrepreneur.  
Some researchers have shown that the only advantage of 
debt financing vis-à-vis equity financing is the tax savings 
generated by the former.    
Another important reason that prevents equity schemes 
coming into practice is the simultaneous presence of the 
interest option.  Interest is a convenient, less effort-
requiring option for both parties, and drives out profit loss 
sharing on analogy with Gresham‘s Law of bad money 
driving out good.   The existence of an inferior product and 
absence of a superior product is possible on various non-
economic grounds.  Convenience may outweigh 
economics, due to the fact that adopting an equity basis 
places additional burdens on the capital owner such as 
vigilance over the operation of the project and bearing of 
financial loss, while entrepreneurs could be willing to 
undertake fixed payments rather than share profits or 
responsibility.  Since there are capital providers who can 
afford to forego possible advantages for the sake of 
convenience and entrepreneurs who can afford to bear all 
the risk of loss, if any, interest rates and mark-up schemes 
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tend to drive out profit and loss sharing mediums.  
Similarly, the tendency to reserve capital away form risk 
even at the cost of a lower return, and the facility provided 
by debt financing of earning interest even on consumption 
loans too have been identified by researchers as factors that 
prevent capital-owners from seeking profit loss sharing 
ventures with investors.    
 Based on the above, some modern Muslim economists 
conclude that as long as interest is allowed to prevail in the 
economy, an Islamic financing technique based on profit 
and loss sharing cannot prevail.  Similarly, despite of the 
higher efficiency of profit and loss sharing techniques in 
most of the operations in the economy, they may remain in 
the background as long as the option of mark up based 
techniques is available to capital providers.  However, as 
mark-up based techniques have a basis in Islamic law, they 
may not be eradicated as interest.  Therefore, these 
economists suggest that in the long term, Islamic 
commercial banks must be gradually barred from 
involvement in mark-up based activities, as is the case with 
non-Islamic banks usually.  Thus, commercial banks would 
have no option but to deal on an equity platform.  There 
could be specialised banks 
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carrying out trading and leasing based on mark-up.   These 
economists feel that without such efforts, profit / loss 
sharing scheme will never be enforced, and will remain in 
use only to the extent to which equity participation is in use 
in the activities of interest-based banking.   
Although the above suggestion appears to be an extreme 
measure unlikely to be sought in the immediate future, 
there is no gainsaying the fact that if equity financing is to 
be promoted with any measure of success, some restriction 
on the proliferation of mark-up based debt-finance schemes 
in areas of financing should be introduced.  This could be 
either through legislation or through sharī‛ah supervisory 
boards of Islamic banks.   
When Islamic banks find themselves obliged to adopt 
equity financing, it could reasonably be assumed that 
speedy solutions may be found to many of the obstacles 
perceived currently.  Customer education, and to a larger 
extent, a change of the identity of the bank too appear 
imperative.  It should be noted that as long as Islamic banks 
maintain their inherited image of a mere lender and 
financial intermediary, they would hardly be considered 
entitled a share in the profits.  Ensuring willingness of the 
clients to adopt equity modes could primarily depend on 
Islamic banks creating for themselves an image of a vibrant 
business partner who could contribute positively to the 
success of the venture.  With the resources available at the 
disposal of a banking institution, this should not prove 
unachievable, especially in view of the higher returns such 
a change could generate.  Management of Islamic banks, 
instead of being assigned solely to personnel trained in 
conventional banking, could be opened for more 
involvement of business expertise.  This could solve 
aspects such as information asymmetry and agency 
problems while also moderating the temperament of 
extreme risk aversion typical of conventional banking, 
bringing a level of commercial approach to investment and 
finance 
IV.      CONCLUSION 
Based on the above discussion, it could be assumed that, 
should Islamic banks make a decisive effort to employ 
equity-based modes on a wider platform, possibility thereof 
is not non-existent.  Although modes based on debt 
financing could be adopted in instances such as facilitating 
acquirement of assets and usufructs, a general reliance on 
debt-based modes for financing purposes could result in the 
non-realisation of Islamic economic objectives.  The ethical 
responsibility of Islamic banks too should not be lost sight 
of.  The developmental nature of an Islamic bank means 
that it has to exert persistent and continuous efforts to 
improve and diversify its investment in order to achieve 
satisfactory results for society, shareholders, depositors and 
partners,  which could be best done through broader 
involvement in equity financing 
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